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The Land that Democratic Theory Forgot
LuIs FUENTES-ROHWER*
The island of Puerto Rico is officially designated as an unincorporated United
States territory. Acquired by the United States in the aftermath of the Spanish-
American war, the status of the island offers innumerable lessons and puzzles for
students of the law of democracy and constitutional law. Begin with the fact that
citizens ofPuerto Rico-U.S. citizens at birth-cannot vote in federal elections but are
subject to the plenary powers of Congress. How do we justify this condition under
American constitutional values and basic tenets of democratic theory? Looking to the
moment of acquisition, how may we reconcile the acquisition of the island in the
aftermath of the war? This question morphs into the larger question of political
obligation and asks, why should citizens of Puerto Rico obey the commands of U.S.
law? Finally, how can we understand the grant of American citizenship to island
residents a generation later? This Article offers tentative answers to these questions,
and in so doing, wishes to open new lines of inquiry about the present status ofPuerto
Rico. This Article concludes that the status of Puerto Rico is illegitimate and in direct
tension with core democratic values. Whether statehood, enhanced commonwealth, or
independence emerges as the status of choice for the island, it is undisputable that the
present condition ofAmerican citizens on Puerto Rican soil must come to an end.
The cause of America is, in a great measure, the cause of all mankind. Many
circumstances hath, and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and through
which the principles of all Lovers of Mankind are affected, and in the Event of
which, their Affections are interested. The laying a Country desolate with Fire and
Sword, declaring War against the natural rights of all Mankind, and extirpating
the Defenders thereoffrom the Face of the Earth, is the concern of every Man to
whom Nature hath given the Power offeeling. I
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INTRODUCTION
The island of Puerto Rico sits on the Caribbean basin, 1000 miles southeast of the
coast of Florida, a short plane trip to American soil. Yet the two countries could not be
any farther apart in social, cultural, or economic terms.2 So far apart, in fact, that
Puerto Rico may be considered "the land that democratic theory forgot." To study the
history of U.S. involvement in Puerto Rico and the present status of the island as an
unincorporated American territory is to be transported to a place that until now only
existed in our imaginations. Or, as Nobel-prize winning novelist Gabriel Garcfa
Mdrquez remarked, "If I told the truth about Puerto Rico... everyone would say I was
making it up."
3
This truth has considerable payoff for scholars of the law of democracy and
constitutional law, as it offers an inimitable window into some of the most important
constitutional questions of our time. Consider, for example, the case of Shafiq Rasul, a
British national captured in Pakistan and transferred to U.S. control in early December
2001 . Within a month of his capture, Mr. Rasul was transferred to the Guantanamo
Bay U.S. naval base, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 5 While in Guantanamo, he brought
various claims against the U.S. government. At the core of his complaint was a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2242 seeking release from his
imprisonment. 6 The court framed the question as "whether aliens held outside the
sovereign territory of the United States can use the courts of the United States to
pursue claims brought under the United States Constitution. ' '7 It answered this
question in the negative and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. 8
But the question cannot be dismissed that easily. Consider first the status of
Guantanamo under U.S. law. After having exclusive jurisdiction over the base for over
a century, could the naval base be anything but a "sovereign territory of the United
States"? It is easy to define this question away and conclude that, under the terms of
this perpetual lease, Cuban sovereignty never ceased over the territory. Far more
interesting is the normative question of whether the United States may legitimately
acquire this territory. This is the question of territoriality-how to justify and
2. See PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA'S COLONY: THE POLrrICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICr
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO Rico (2004).
3. Angel R. Oquendo, Liking to Be in America: Puerto Rico's Quest For Difference in the
United States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 249, 249 (2004) (citing Elea.Carey, Spark's Novel
Was Worth the Wait, COM. APPEAL, Jan. 22, 1995, at G3).
4. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.D.C. 2002).
5. Id. at 57.
6. Id. at 62.
7. Id. at 56.
8. Id. at 72-73.
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legitimize territorial acquisitions of what we would otherwise think of as sovereign, or
at the very least semi-sovereign, peoples by a more powerful, conquering sovereign?
The question of territoriality is closely followed by the question of
constitutionalism. For context, think about the United States and its "war on terror."
Could a nation apprehend an individual suspected of aiding the enemy during times of
war, place them in confinement in a territory this nation clearly controls, yet ultimately
deny these individuals mere access to the courts or contact with an attorney on the
view that the confinement is "outside [its] sovereign territory"? 9 Put more generally,
does the Constitution follow the flag wherever the United States acquires foreign
lands?
These questions alone make the example of Puerto Rico an important case study,
worthy of careful scholarly attention. '0 But as this Article argues, the case of Puerto
Rico offers much more. Consider the facts: Puerto Rico is an American territory and its
citizens are American citizens at birth dating back to the Jones Act of 1917. "1 And yet
American citizens residing on the island may not participate in federal elections, while
the island itself is subject to the plenary powers of Congress. 12 A worse example:
American citizens residing on the mainland may relocate to a foreign country and
continue to vote via absentee ballot--courtesy of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (the "Voting Act")-but lose their statutory right if they relocate
to Puerto Rico. 13
The logic of this last example is maddening in its simplicity. The Voting Act
applies only to persons "who reside[] outside the United States," and the statutory
language clearly defines "United States ... where used in the territorial sense, [to]
mean[] the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa."' 14 Puerto Rico is thus not a state for
purposes of electoral representation, but is part of the United States for absentee voting
purposes. On either account, residents of Puerto Rico are disenfranchised under a
political regime that holds plenary power over them. Heads I win, tails you lose.
On these facts, the questions of territoriality and constitutionalism identified earlier
in the Article acquire greater nuance and urgency. For example, and looking only to
the aftermath of the Spanish-American war, how can one defend the acquisition of the
9. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950)).
10. I am not alone in this sentiment. See, e.g., FOREIGN IN A DomESTIc SENSE: PUERTO RICO,
AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTrrUION (Christina Duffy Bumett & Burke Marshall eds.,
2001); Jaime B. Fuster, The Origins of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation and Its
Implications Regarding the Power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to Regulate Interstate
Commerce, 43 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 259 (1974); Marcos A. Ramirez, Los Casos Insulares: Un
Estudio Sobre el Proceso Judicial, 16 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 121 (1946); Efr6n Rivera Ramos, The
Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 225 (1996); Ediberto RomAn, Empire Forgotten: The United States Colonization of
Puerto Rico, 42 ViLL. L. REV. 1119 (1997).
11. Ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). The Act has been frequently amended and is
presently codified as 48 U.S.C. § 737 (2000).
12. See Igartua-De La Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 168 (lst Cir. 2005).
13. Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff
(Supp. IV 2000)).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-6(8).
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island by the United States on grounds of constitutional law? More crucially, why
should citizens of Puerto Rico obey the commands of U.S. law? And relatedly, how
does one understand the grant of American citizenship to island residents?
These questions tell a peculiar and ultimately troubling story about the relationship
between Puerto Rico and the United States. This is a story where race plays a
prominent role, a story of distrust for territorial residents and of arbitrary rule by an
overseas empire. Indeed, it is difficult to square many strands of this story with
American constitutional values. Courts and commentators often attempt to do so,' 5 but
it is hard to be impressed-much less persuaded-by their efforts. This Article
concludes that the status of Puerto Rico is illegitimate on many fronts. Whether
statehood, enhanced commonwealth, or independence emerges as the status of choice
for the island,16 the present condition of American citizens on Puerto Rican soil-as
disenfranchised second class citizens-must come to an end. This Article explores and
defends this claim over the course of four Parts.
Part I discusses the two central questions a nation must face while setting on the
course of empire building. These are the questions of territoriality and
constitutionalism. This Part concludes that territorial acquisitions must be analyzed
with much suspicion, as they involve notions of self-determination and political free
will. At the heart of this Part lies the question of whether a liberal representative
democracy has the power to foster colonial status.
To ask the question is to answer it. Parts II and III bring this conclusion to bear on
the historical and constitutional canvass provided by the island of Puerto Rico. Part H
examines the three leading themes at the heart of the colonial relationship between the
United States and Puerto Rico: race, mistrust and arbitrary rule through plenary
powers.
Part III discusses three basic questions of democratic theory as applied to the island.
First, under what theory of political obligation should residents of Puerto Rico obey the
commands of U.S. law? Second, what is the meaning of citizenship and what role has
it played for Puerto Ricans post-1917? And third, how can one explain, much less
justify, the mass disenfranchisement of millions of citizens living on U.S. soil? This
Part concludes that the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States fails to
meet these basic standards of democratic theory. Finally, Part IV discusses and
ultimately rebuts one common justification of the status quo: the notion that citizens of
Puerto Rico do not pay U.S. income taxes.
15. See, e.g., Igartda de la Rosa v. United States (Igartia IV), 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc); Igartda de la Rosa v. United States (Igartza 1), 842 F. Supp. 607 (D.P.R. 1994), afftd,
32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.1994); John C. Fortier, The Constitution Is Clear: Only States Vote in
Congress, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 403 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/05/19/
fortier.html.
16. See Jost TRIAS MONGE, PUERTO Rico: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE
WORLD 3 (1997).
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I. ON THE POWER TO ACQUIRE TERRITORIES: Two BASIC QUESTIONS
Small islands not capable of protecting themselves, are the proper objects for
kingdoms to take under their care.
Put yourself in the position of a benevolent conqueror, living at 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue at the turn of the twentieth century and wishing to expand the reach of your
empire across the globe. Before moving forward, you must confront three separate yet
interrelated questions. First, does the Constitution grant you-and Congress-a
general power to acquire new territories? Students of American law will immediately
recognize that this inquiry should pose challenging questions under a constitutional
regime of enumerated powers. Assuming this question is answered affirmatively, the
real question at the heart of your project of empire rises to the forefront: does the
aforementioned Constitution apply to the newly acquired territory expropio vigore?
This question is directly related to a third, for assuming that the full constitutional
structure does not apply to the territories upon acquisition, are its citizens devoid of
fundamental protections "recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples"? 18
These questions should be familiar to modem ears, courtesy of the "war on terror"
and the role played by the U.S. Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as a detention
center for the war's enemy combatants. 19 But they are not new questions. This Part
examines them in turn, and in so doing, places the status of Puerto Rico in historical
context.
A. Power and Legitimacy
The first question is perhaps the easiest one to answer. As a matter of sovereignty,
or the inherent powers of states qua states, a nation possesses the right to acquire
territories incident to its status as an independent state.2° While this might be true in
theory, it is not so as a question of U.S. constitutional law. In that context, the question
is whether the power to acquire territories is among those powers catalogued under
Article I. Unsurprisingly, the question dates back to the early years of the Republic.
While defending the constitutionality of the proposed national bank, for example,
Alexander Hamilton wrote, "[i]t is not denied, that there are implied, as well as express
powers, and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter. ' ' 2 ' To Hamilton,
17. PAINE, supra note 1, at 35.
18. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2795-98 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intraterritorial Constitution, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 369 (2007); Gerald L. Neuman, ExtraterritorialRights and Constitutional
Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2073 (2005); Kermit Roosevelt 1H,
Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2017 (2005);
Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and "The Water's Edge ": Sovereignty, "Territorial
Jurisdiction, "and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 (2006).
20. See generally EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Charles G. Fenwick
trans., 1758), reprinted in 3 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed.,
1964).
21. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version ofan Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
15292008]
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the power to acquire territories was neither express in the language of the Constitution
nor implied from the same grant of power. Yet almost in passing, Hamilton offered
"another class of powers," which he labeled "resulting powers." 22He explained, and in
so doing offered an example that bears directly on my inquiry: "It will not be doubted
that if the United States should make a conquest on any of the territories of its
neighbours, they would possess sovereign jurisdiction over the conquered territory. 23
Recall that this was neither an express nor an implied power, but rather, a power
inherent in sovereignty; or, in Hamilton's words, "This would rather be a result from
the whole mass of the powers of the government & from the nature of political society,
than a consequence of either of the powers especially enumerated." 24
This position was not universally accepted at the time. In fact, President Jefferson
argued against such a power the first time it came into question, during the process that
led to the Louisiana Purchase. 25 In fairness, Jefferson was only being faithful to his
constitutional principles of limited government and enumerated powers, for the
Constitution clearly did not expressly grant Congress the power to acquire territories.
Thus, he wrote to Wilson Cary Nicholas: "Our peculiar security is in possession of a
written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction. 26 To his credit,
he drafted an amendment intended to overcome this constitutional obstacle. In the end,
he yielded to the demands of political expediency. Because an amendment would take
considerable time, some feared that Napoleon would take back his offer to sell the
27territory, so Jefferson relented. Jefferson explained in the same letter where he
expressed his constitutional doubts: "If, however, our friends shall think differently,
certainly I acquiesce with satisfaction; confiding, that the good sense of our country
will correct the evil of construction when it shall produce ill effects. 28 In the end,
public opinion won out; as Gouverneur Morris explained when asked about this very
Establish a Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 100 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,




25. 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 356 (Earl N. Harbert ed., Library of America 1986)
(1889-91). In fact, Adams argues that the constitutional question arose as soon as Jefferson sent
Monroe to France to buy New Orleans and Florida. Id. at 354.
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1139, 1140 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) [hereinafter Letter to
Nicholas]. He continues:
I say the same as to the opinion of those who consider the grant of the treaty
making power as boundless. If it is, then we have no Constitution .... If it has
bounds, they can be no others than the definitions of the powers which that
instrument gives.... Let us go on then perfecting it, by adding, by way of
amendment to the Constitution, those powers which time & trial show are still
wanting.
Id.
27. See EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE 1803-1812, at 25 (1920).
28. Letter to Nicholas, supra note 26. John Quincy Adams accused Jefferson of hypocrisy,
for taking this stance immediately upon assuming office yet campaigning under a states' rights
banner. BROWN, supra note 27, at 30-31.
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same topic, "It would, therefore, have been perfectly Utopian to oppose a paper
restriction to the violence of popular sentiment in a popular government. ' 29
A generation later, the U.S. Supreme Court legitimated what politics had made
expedient, in American Insurance Co. v. Canter.30 At issue in Canter was the power of
Congress to establish a territorial law for the territory of Florida prior to its admission
as a state. In order to answer this question, the Court first had to determine "the
relation in which Florida stands to the national government., 31 This issue, which
looked back to the Louisiana Purchase, is whether the U.S. government has the
constitutional power to acquire territories. The Court answered this question
affirmatively.
Speaking through the Chief Justice, the Court concluded that the treaty and war
powers included an implicit power to acquire territories from other nations. 32 Yet when
looking through Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, and keeping in mind the larger
question of constitutional authority, one is struck by the way in which the Chief Justice
disposed of such an important question with so few words. The reasoning was nothing
short of ipse dixit, for not once did he wrestle with the difficult question of
constitutional authority to acquire foreign territories. The Chief Justice only addressed
the status of the territories once acquired and the condition of those persons now
subject to the authority of their new sovereign. 33
The conclusion that the political branches of the United States have the power to
acquire territories is unquestioned. Far more interesting and difficult is the subsequent
question; for, once a new territory is acquired, the question of power immediately turns
into what I call a question of constitutionalism. Does the Constitution apply to the new
territory as soon as it becomes a part of the United States? What duties and protections
flow to the inhabitants of these territories? That is to say, does the Constitution "follow
the flag"?
B. Constitutionalism, Fundamental Rights and the Territories
Questions about the reach of constitutional proscriptions and protections stand at
the core of a larger debate about a country's imperial aspirations. Such was the case at
the turn of the twentieth century, when the United States annexed Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Philippines in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. 34 To this point, the
29. BROWN, supra note 27, at 31 (quoting 3 JARED SPARKS, LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS
185 (1832)).
30. 26 U.S. 511 (1828).
31. Id. at516n.*.
32. Id. at 542 ("The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union the
powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently, that Government possesses the
power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty."). In so answering this question,
the Court concluded that the acquired territories remain at the whim of Congress under its
general power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States." Id. In this way, the Court upheld the Circuit Court's
ruling; it concluded that the Florida act is not in violation of the Constitution, for the court in
question is not a constitutional but a legislative court, subject to congressional authority.
33. Id. at 542 (arguing that the treaty is not the sole source for the terms of the annexation,
since these may also be modified at will "on such [terms] as its new master shall impose").
34. For a wonderful, brief history, see Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship,
20081 1531
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
Supreme Court had offered two related positions. In Canter, Chief Justice Marshall
contended that the terms of the treaty of cession controlled the terms of the new
relationship between the acquired territory and the sovereign.35 Yet Chief Justice
Marshall argued that the treaty was not the sole source for the terms of the annexation,
since these may also be modified at will "on such [terms] as its new master shall
,36impose." This was another way of saying that the territories remained at the will and
grace of the sovereign.
Chief Justice Taney offered a contrasting position in Dred Scott v. Sandford.37 For
Taney, the power to acquire new territories resided within the power to admit new
states into the union. 38 If this position is correct, then the power to acquire territories
was only a grant of authority for the particular purpose of expanding the membership
of the nation. In Taney's words, "in the construction of this power by all the
departments of the Government, it has been held to authorize the acquisition of
territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population
and situation would entitle it to admission." 39 Territories were acquired for the sole
purpose of becoming states, "and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress
with absolute authority." 4
In a collection of cases commonly known as the Insular Cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court followed neither position. 41 In light of the particular history of the annexation of
Puerto Rico, the Court faced three separate questions. First, what was the constitutional
status of the island from the time of American occupation, on 25 July 1898, to the
signing of the Treaty of Paris on 10 December of that same year? Second, what was
the island's status between the times of the signing of the Treaty to the passage of the
Foraker Act, which established a civilian government for the island? Finally, how did
the Foraker Act affect the constitutional status of the island and its inhabitants? This
final question had two related components. One, did Congress have unfettered powers
over the territories? And two, what rights must be accorded to territorial residents?
The first two questions can be answered summarily. From the time of occupation
until the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the island had remained a foreign nation,42 that
is, "one exclusively within the sovereignty of a foreign nation, and without the
sovereignty of the United States. 43 To the Court, this meant that tariffs collected
during this period were in fact constitutional, imposed in accordance to "the law of
arms and the right of conquest," as well as the "general principles in respect to war and
and LatCrit Theory: The Case of Racial Transformations Circa the Spanish American War,
1896-1900, 78 DENY. U. L. REV. 921 (2001).
35. Canter, 26 U.S. at 542.
36. Id.
37. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
38. Id. at 446-47.
39. Id. at 447.
40. Id.
41. Scholars largely limit the label of Insular Cases to nine cases decided during the
Court's 1901 Term. Five of these cases dealt particularly with questions concerning the status of
Puerto Rico. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S.
243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
42. Dooley, 182 U.S. at 233-34; see also Armstrong, 182 U.S. at 243.
43. DeLima, 182 U.S. at 180.
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peace between nations." 44 Once the occupation led to formal acquisition through the
Treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico ceased to be a foreign country and became a territory of
the United States, "although not an organized territory in the technical sense.",
45
These questions lost their relevance once Congress enacted the Foraker Act and
established a civilian government for the island. All future questions hinged on the
status of Puerto Rico from that point forward. This is the place where the imperialist
debate carried on. The question was of utmost importance because the imperial project
demanded colonial subjects; that is, could the political branches acquire foreign
territories on less than a promise of full membership into the American polity? More
specifically, could Congress set some territories on the path to statehood while placing
others under perpetual colonial rule? And with the passage of time, could Congress
change its collective mind and release some of the acquired territories from its
authority? 46
In the case of Downes v. Bidwell,47 the question for the Court was whether the
status of the island of Puerto Rico had changed after passage of the Foraker Act. Put
more pointedly: would the Court side with Marshall or Taney? The question was
indeed a difficult one; at least the Court thought so and splintered accordingly. 4
Writing for himself, Justice Brown set out a position now commonly known as the
"extension theory." As he wrote, the issue in Downes was "whether the revenue
clauses of the Constitution extend of their own force to our newly acquired
territories., 49 The answer was perhaps too obvious-Congress has plenary authority
over any and all acquired territories, and the Constitution applies to them at the
discretion of Congress. This view comes with a ready exception: the Constitution does
extend to the territories, even against congressional wishes, when dealing with "those
fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the
Constitution and its amendments., 50 Interestingly, the Court never followed this
position.51
In concurrence, Justice White developed the "incorporation theory," which soon
became the leading view in this area. 52 To Justice White, the initial concern was over
44. Dooley, 182 U.S. at 232.
45. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 196; see Goetze, 182 U.S. at 221; Huus v. New York & P.R.
Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
46. See Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 797 (2005).
47. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
48. See id. at 244 n.1; 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 431 (1922) ("The division of opinion on the Court was sharp and pronounced.").
49. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
50. Id. at 268.
51. JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 53 (1985); see David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: Full Faith and the Bill ofRights, 1889-1910,52 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 874 (1985) (calling
Brown's opinion in Downes "distressing").
52. Downes, 182 U.S. at 288 (White, J., concurring); see Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138 (1904); Frederick R. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation,
26 COLUM. L. REv. 823 (1926). For a recent critique, see Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States,
Puerto Rico, and the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional
Authoritarianism, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 55, 56-57 (1997).
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the congressional disposition over the territory at issue. This question had a simple
answer: the Constitution generally applies to incorporated territories. 53 The second
question, and the one that occupied most of Justice White's attention, was more
difficult. Referring specifically to the facts in Downes, this was whether Congress had
"power to locally govern at discretion. ' ' 4 He answered this question affirmatively,
under either Article IV, section 3, which grants Congress the power "to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the
United States," or as an implicit corollary to the right to acquire such territories.55
Having determined that Congress had the power to act, the question was then:
which constitutional provisions apply to a given territory? Justice White concluded that
the answer depended on the status of the territory in question. In the case of Puerto
Rico, an unincorporated territory, only those fundamental principles "which are the
basis of all free governments" would affect congressional actions.56 In other words,
Congress would be asked to proffer a compelling state interest whenever its legislation
over the territories implicated fundamental principles. According to Justice White, the
constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation and matters of customs was not
one such principle, and as a result, Congress was free to regulate it at will. This
understanding remained unaffected after the Jones Act of 1917, when citizens of
Puerto Rico were granted U.S. citizenship.
5 7
In dissent, Justice Harlan developed a view he would echo in all subsequent
territorial cases. 58 As he argued in Downes, the Constitution "speaks... to all peoples,
whether of States or territories, who are subject to the authority of the United States. 59
He explained:
The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon the earth, by
conquest or treaty, and hold them as were colonies or provinces--the people
inhabiting them to enjoy only such rights as Congress chooses to accord to them--
is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius as well as with the words of the
Constitution.
60
53. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197 (1903) (concluding that Newlands Resolution does not require full application of the
Constitution to Hawaii, since it is only an annexed territory, not yet incorporated, and the rights
at issue are not fundamental but procedural). Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922),
finalized the establishment of the incorporation doctrine.
54. Downes, 182 U.S. at 290 (White, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 291. This position was first developed in a famous exchange in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review. See Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A
Third View, 13 HARv. L. REv. 155 (1899).
57. Ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917); see, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 307
(1922).
58. Downes, 182 U.S. at 376 (Harlan, J. dissenting); see Trono v. United States, 199 U.S.
521, 535 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 528 (Harlan, J., concurring);
Doff v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mankichi, 190 U.S. at
226 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Downes, 182 U.S. at 378 (Harlan J., dissenting) (citing Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304,
327 (1816)).
60. Id. at 380.
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His point was a simple one: no distinctions may be made between the acquired.
territories and the applicability of constitutional guarantees. Instead, it was all or
nothing; either the Constitution applies in full or not at all. 61 As with Justice Brown's
position, Justice Harlan's view has received scant support through the years.
II. THE UNITED STATES COMES TO "PORTO" RICO: THEMES
Is it, perhaps, possible that there are two kinds of Civilization--one for home
consumption and one for the heathen market?
6 2
The Insular Cases did not begin the formal relationship between the United States
and Puerto Rico; rather, these cases sanctioned the imperial experiment raging at the
turn of the century in two ways. First, they allowed for the establishment of territorial
rule at the bequest of Congress at a level far less than that of statehood. The
Constitution only followed the flag if Congress decided that it do so. And second,
these cases allowed for congressional mistakes and changes of heart. That is, to acquire
a territory need no longer mean-if it ever did-that the new acquisition must remain a
permanent possession of the United States. What Congress acquired, the Insular Cases
taught us, Congress can always set free.6 3
Before examining the particular implications of the insular cases to the island, this
Part places the acquisition of Puerto Rico in context. It bears repeating: the Spanish-
American war officially began on April 25 with a declaration from Congress. Three
months later, on July 25, General Nelson A. Miles directly led the U.S. invasion of
Puerto Rico, landing in Gudnica-a southwestern city located 98 miles from San
Juan-and finding little resistance. The U.S. Army secured the island within a month,
and on December 10 of that year Spain and the United States agreed to the Treaty of
Paris, ending hostilities between the two nations. As a spoil of victory, Spain ceded
both "Porto" Rico and Guam to the United States.aIt is now a little over a hundred
years of American rule over the island.65
Three related themes mark this period in the history of Puerto Rico and its
relationship with the United States. This Part examines them in turn.
A. Race and Manifest Destiny
According to Juan Perea, "[riace and racism have always played central roles in the
ideology of United States conquest and United States citizenship." 66 This view is
61. Cf Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
62. Mark Twain, To the Person Sitting in Darkness, 172 N. AM. REV. 161,167 (Feb. 1901).
63. See Burnett, supra note 46, at 802.
64. Under Article III, Spain also ceded "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands,"
for a payment of $20 million. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
65. For a wonderful brief account of this moment in American history, see TiDAS MONGE,
supra note 16.
66. Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race and the Insular Cases, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 10 at 140; see Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States,
Puerto Rico, and the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional
Authoritarianism, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 55 (1997). For a specific application of this
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undeniably true of the case of Puerto Rico. Debates in the early part of the twentieth
century were rife with talk of Anglo-Saxon superiority and the need for those inferior
beings within the acquired territories to become acculturated in the ways and mores of
the United States. Congressmen would speak freely about people who "can neither
comprehend nor support representative government constructed on the Anglo-Saxon
plan' 67 and how God "has made us adepts in government that we may administer
government among savage and senile peoples"; 68 political scientists of great influence
would write that only after "centuries of discipline" did the "Anglo-Saxon race"
become fit for self-government; 69 and the Supreme Court would offer dictum
explaining how "it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to the annexation of
territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our
habits, traditions and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United
States."7
These views about racial superiority and democratic literacy played a crucial role in
the development of policies with respect to the newly acquired territories. Take, for
example, the Insular Cases, where the Court ultimately drew a sharp distinction
between incorporated territories firmly on the road toward statehood, such as Hawaii
and Alaska, and unincorporated territories, such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines, in
constitutional limbo and on the road to nowhere. 71These cases have nary a friend in the
world. Commentators brand the language of the opinions as "undeniably racist,"72 and
argument to the history of Puerto Rico, see RONALD FERNANDEZ, THE DISENCHANTED ISLAND:
PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 13 (1992).
67. 62 CONG. REc. 2798 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Slayton).
68. Rogers M. Smith, The Bitter Roots of Puerto Rican Citizenship, in FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 10, at 373, 378 (citing 56 CONG. REC. 711 (1900) (remarks of Sen.
Albert Beveridge)). This is not to suggest that matters have improved. For a recent example, see
137 CONG. REC. 3962 (1991) (statement of Senator Moynihan) (asserting that statements by
other Senators during a debate over the status of Puerto Rico were "the most shameful display
of nativism I have yet to encounter in 15 years in the Senate"); see also Ediberto Romdn, The
Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1,
32 ("Congress' nativist and xenophobic fears continue to threaten the process that may lead to
freedom and full acceptance for the people of Puerto Rico.").
69. Smith, supra note 68, at 377 (citing Abbot Lawrence Lowell, The Colonial Expansion
of the United States, 83 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 145, 149-54 (1899)); see Simeon E. Baldwin, The
Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of
Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REv. 393, 415 (1899).
70. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,280 (1901); see RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN
U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1893-1946, at 162-63 (1972) ("The actions of the federal government during the imperial
period and the relation of the Negro to a status of second-class citizenship indicated that the
Southern point of view would prevail. The racism which caused the relegation of the Negro to a
status of inferiority was to be applied to the overseas possessions of the United States.").
71. The Court's analysis on this point leaves a lot to be desired, as the intent of Congress is
not as unambiguous as the Court intimates. Compare People v. Balzac, 258 U.S. 298 (1922),
with Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905), and Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903).
72. Efrrn Rivera Ramos, Deconstructing Colonialism: The "Unincorporated Territory" as
a Category of Domination, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 10, at 113; see
Deborah D. Herrera, Unincorporated and Exploited: Deferential Treatment for Trust Territory
Claimant-Why Doesn't the Constitution Follow the Flag, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 593,609-
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their constitutional principle as "distressing ' 73 and "morally illegitimate,, 74"designed
for the convenience of the conqueror,"75 and on the same plane with its contemporary
Plessy v. Ferguson.76 A leading critical voice, Judge Juan Torruella of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, contends that the Insular Cases "are anchored on theories of dubious
legal or historical validity, contrived by academics interested in promoting an
expansionist agenda.,
77
For a more innocuous example, take the creation of a "citizenship of Puerto Rico"
under the Foraker Act.78 Under Section 7 of the Act, those residing in Puerto Rico after
April 11, 1899-and their children born after this date-"shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States."79
On its face, this language simply appears to recognize the status of those who live in
Puerto Rico as citizens of that territory. But there is more to the story.
The process whereby Congress created a "citizenship of Puerto Rico" was also
tinged with strong racial overtones. As Rogers Smith argues, "this peculiar
'citizenship' was spawned by American turn-of-the-century racism." 80 A "citizenship
of Puerto Rico" was defined by what it clearly was not-American citizenship.
Professor Smith explains: "Congress created that category expressly as another
subordinate status, inferior to U.S. citizenship, and inferior explicitly because
America's political and intellectual leaders regarded Puerto Rico as not just a separate
but as yet another unequal race, incapable of full self-governance."
81
For a final example, look no further that the Treaty of Paris, whereby Spain ceded,
inter alia, Puerto Rico. 82 Under Article IX, Spanish subjects could choose to stay
within the relinquished lands or return to Spain; and if they chose to stay, Article IX
made clear that they would retain their property rights as well as "the right to carry on
their industry, commerce and professions." 83 For those who chose to remain in the
relinquished lands, these subjects could retain their allegiance to the Spanish Crown, or
else they could renounce such allegiance and accept the nationality of the territory
where they live. 84
As for the mixed-race creoles (criollos) who also inhabited these lands, Article IX
was not quite as accommodating. The relevant language was brief and direct: "The
civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded
to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." 85 Or, more bluntly: these
10 (1992).
73. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full Faith and the Bill of
Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 874 (1985).
74. RomAn, supra note 68, at 23.
75. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909,964 (1991).
76. 163 U.S. 527 (1896).
77. Igartia de la Rosa v. United States (Igartia IV), 417 F.3d 145, 163 (1st Cir. 2005)
(Torruella, J., dissenting).
78. 31 Stat 77 (1900) (codified as amended at 48 USC § 731 et seq (2000)).
79. 31 Stat. 77, 79 (1900). So long, of course, as they did not elect to preserve their
allegiance to Spain under provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Id.
80. Smith, supra note 68, at 375.
81. Id. at 380.
82. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.





subjects lost their Spanish citizenship and were given no assurances about their civil
and political rights. Their fate now rested in Congress' hands, yet that body was not
pre-committing to anything; it would determine at a later date what the rights of those
inhabiting the newly acquired territories would be. Imperialism takes practice, after all,
and the United States was still new at it.
It bears noting that this was the first time in its history that the United States
acquired territories without the concomitant promise of citizenship or eventual
statehood. 86 The island's mixture of Black, Indian, and Spanish blood proved too much
for the United States, and it "rendered the island incapable of independent self-
government. 87
B. Distrust and Safeguards
The second theme is one of distrust of island affairs and the need for structural
safeguards. This theme remains to this day and flows directly from the perceptions of
racial superiority and unfitness for self-government discussed in the previous section.
Under the Foraker Act, for example, the United States established a civil government
for the island and called for a governor appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate; an eleven-member executive council appointed by the President
also with the advice and consent of the Senate; and a thirty-five-member legislature.
88
Further, the Act created a Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and provided for a nonvoting
Resident Commissioner to represent the island.89
Notably, the Act did not grant American citizenship upon the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico, instead choosing to create the new status of "citizens of Puerto Rico." 9 The Act
also did not stipulate a Bill of Rights for the island, nor did it explicitly settle the
question of the right to travel to and from the mainland. As for the precautions, and to
name the most prominent ones: the President and the Senate appointed most political
functionaries, including the governor and judges, and the President retained the right to
remove the governor at will; only five of the eleven members of the executive council
must be born in Puerto Rico; Congress reserved the right to annul any law enacted by
the Puerto Rican legislature at any time, and could legislate for the island even for
affairs considered local in nature; and losing parties could appeal decisions by the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to the U.S. Supreme Court.9' The island also held no
effective representation in the U.S. Congress.
92
Seventeen years later, the United States enacted a second Organic Act for the
island, also known as the Jones Act of 1917. 93 According to the noted historian Jos6
Trias Monge, the Jones Act "represented a modest step forward on the long road
86. See WESTON, supra note 70, at 184.
87. Id.




92. See TORRUELLA, supra note 5 1, at 118.
93. Jones Act (Puerto Rico), ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1402 (1976)).
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toward self-government." 94 Above all, the Act replaced the executive council
established under the Foraker Act for an elective Senate.95 Yet distrust for the politics
of the island remained high, as seen in a number of important provisions. For example,
legislative actions were subject to a gubernatorial veto, and in the event of a legislative
override, the President held final authority. Congress also retained the right to annul
local laws any time it wished, and could go as far as to legislate for the island.96 The
resulting regime, wrote Judge Torruella, subjected the people of Puerto Rico "to almost
absolute central discretion."
97
This level of distrust for the politics of the island survived future congressional
efforts. But this should not suggest that the United States did not make any
concessions, and it would be unfair to suggest otherwise. For example, President
Truman designated then Commissioner Resident Jesus T. Pifiero as the first Puerto
Rican to serve as island governor in 1946, and the following year, the Elective
Governor Act allowed the people of Puerto Rico to elect their own governor.98
As a general matter, however, Congress retained much control over island affairs.
Of particular interest is Pub. L. 600, signed into law by President Truman in 1950 and
approved by a referendum on the island with 76.5% of the vote.99 Under this law,
Puerto Rico could draft its own constitution, which it did in 1952. More importantly,
the law had the potential to transform the relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States as one grounded on consensual norms. According to Governor Luis
Mufioz Marfn, for example, "the principle that the relationship is from now on one of
consent through free agreement, wipes out all trace of colonialism."
1°°
Yet Congress clearly felt otherwise. Time and again, members of Congress
expressed the view that Pub. L. 600 and the enactment of a Puerto Rican Constitution
did not alter the prior relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.'
Further, Congress must ultimately approve the Constitution itself, and reserved the
right to object and ultimately eliminate any provisions it disapproved. 0 2 Most
damningly, Congress could even revoke the Constitution of Puerto Rico unilaterally;'
0 3
as Mufioz Matnn himself conceded during a congressional hearing in 1950, "if the
94. TRiS MONGE, supra note 16, at 75.
95. See TRfAs MONGE, supra note 16, at 75.
96. See id.
97. TORRUELLA, supra note 51, at 118.
98. Elective Governor Act of 1947 § 7, 48 U.S.C. § 737 (2000).
99. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319.
100. TRIAS MONGE, supra note 16, at 115 ("According to Governor Luis Mufioz Marfn, for
example, passage of the new constitution established 'the principle that the relationship is from
now on one of consent through free agreement, wipes out all trace of colonialism'"); see
ALFREDO MONTALvO-BARBOT, POLTICAL CONFLICr AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN PUERTO
Rico, 1989-1952, at 143 (1997) (contending that "in general, the presentation of the Puerto
Rican people as passive agents in the constitutional transformation of the island, an argument
advanced by gradualists and traditional colonialist studies, is analytically and empirically
simplistic and questionable").
101. See TRfAs MONGE, supra note 16, at 149-58.
102. Id. at 114-15.
103. See id.
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people of Puerto Rico should go crazy, Congress can always get around and legislate
again." 1 04
C. Plenary Powers and Arbitrary Rule
The third theme flows directly from the Insular Cases and the doctrine of
incorporation. To this day, the Supreme Court maintains that Puerto Rico has not been
incorporated into the United States through an act of Congress. 10 5 This conclusion has
meant not only that Congress holds plenary powers over the island until it decides
otherwise, but that residents of Puerto Rico enjoy only those guarantees of the Bill of
Rights deemed by the Court as fundamental. The consequences for the island have
been abysmal. 106
Two per curiam opinions stand out in my mind, though the field is not lacking for
worthy candidates. The first is Califano v. Torres. 107 The plaintiff in Califano was a
former resident of Connecticut who had qualified for benefits under the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program while residing there. 108 Upon moving to Puerto Rico,
his benefits were discontinued. 109 This case was not a difficult application of the law;
under the relevant language, beneficiaries could not apply for support under the
program for any month they resided outside the "United States," and the statute
defined "United States" as "the 50 states and the District of Columbia.'"' A three-
judge district court declared the law unconstitutional,"' but the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. 112 To hold otherwise, the Court offered, would grant those who just arrived
in Puerto Rico "benefits superior to those enjoyed by other residents of Puerto
Rico." 113
More puzzling were three further reasons offered by the Court in support of the law:
"First, because of the unique tax status of Puerto Rico, its residents do not contribute to
the public treasury. Second, the cost of including Puerto Rico would be extremely
great-an estimated $300 million per year. Third, inclusion in the SSI program might
seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy."11 4 These are puzzling reasons because
they are not factors traditionally used by the Court when deciding questions of
constitutional law on the merits. 115 Whether citizens of Puerto Rico pay federal taxes,
or whether the cost of the benefits to those living in Puerto Rico would be too costly or
disruptive, are questions for Congress to consider, not the Court. These considerations
104. Puerto Rico Constitution: Hearings on H.R. 7674 and S. 3336 Before the H. Comm. on
Public Lands, 81st Cong. 33 (1950).
105. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
106. See TORRUELLA, supra note 51, at ch. 5.
107. 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
108. Id. at 2-3.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at2.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at5.
113. Id. at4.
114. Id. at 5 n.7.
115. See TORRuELLA, supra note 51, at I11.
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do not help decide whether the classification in question violates the equality principle
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The second notable opinion is Harris v. Rosario. 116 The statute at issue in Harris
was the Aid for Families with Dependant Children Act (AFDC). Unlike the SSI
program, the AFDC program included island residents among its beneficiaries, with
the caveat that territorial residents were assisted at lower levels than those on the
mainland. 117 As in Califano, the district court in Harris struck down the law under the
5th Amendment's equal protection clause." 8 And once again, the Supreme Court
tersely reversed. 119 In addition to the economic reasons offered in Califano, the Court
added in a telling footnote that leveling the benefits for residents of Puerto Rico would
cost around $30 million dollars a year, and if the argument were applied to other
programs under the Social Security Act, the cost could balloon to $240 million
dollars. 120
As with Califano, it is not clear why these reasons should play any role when
deciding a question of constitutional law. What is clear, unfortunately, is that these
cases are not outlying points on an otherwise traditional constitutional terrain, with
questions over the status of Puerto Rico receiving the same thoughtful reflection as all
others. Rather, they are routine examples of the Court's unwillingness to engage these
difficult questions. Or, as Alex Aleinikoff explained, "Harris is a startling and
troubling example of the Court's unwillingness to give any serious scrutiny-indeed,
any serious thought-to congressional exercises of power over the territories."''2
In sum, the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico has been
grounded on distrust due to the almost unlimited discretion of the mainland to rule over
island affairs. The burgeoning American empire demanded nothing less. As might be
expected, the implications for the island and its residents have been appalling. These
implications are the subject of the next Part.
Ill. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE COMMONWEALTH: ON THE FAILINGS OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
The result of what has been said is that while in an international sense
Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was subject to the
sovereignty of and was owned by the United States, it was foreign to the
United States in a domestic sense, because the island had not been
incorporated into the United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as
a possession. 1
22
116. 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
117. Id. at 651.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 651-52.
120. Id. at 652 n.*.
121. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and
Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 22 (1994).
122. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341-42 (1901).
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This brief account of the leading themes in the history of Puerto Rico under United
States rule tells a familiar story. To talk about territorial acquisitions in U.S. history is
inevitably to invoke themes of racial superiority, imperial aspirations, and colonial
struggles. The examples are many, from western expansion and the Louisiana
Purchase, to the Mexican War and the conquest of Hawaii.123 At the heart of these
struggles are questions about self-determination and the rights of native inhabitants to
their lands. 124 The example of Puerto Rico-and the Spanish-American War in
general-is no exception.
This Part examines the troubling implications of this history through the lens of
democratic theory. Three questions ground this discussion. First, how does the United
States justify exercising authority over Puerto Rico? This is a basic question of
political theory yet seldom asked-at least explicitly-in debates over the status of the
island. Second, what is the meaning of United States citizenship as extended to the
people of Puerto Rico? The first two discussions converge on the third, which
questions the mass disenfranchisement of American citizens residing on Puerto Rican
soil.
A. Obligation, Consent, and Why Puerto Ricans Obey American Law
This section measures Puerto Rico's colonial reality against a basic pre-condition of
democratic theory. This is the question of constitutional authority and obligation. Why
should anyone, whether a state, an institution, or citizens in general, obey
constitutional commands? As applied to the island, under what theory of constitutional
obligation are Puerto Ricans living on the island bound to follow constitutional
prescriptions? What is needed is an argument for the proposition that citizens of the
island of Puerto Rico are bound to obey the United States Constitution, a document
they neither know very well nor have accepted as their supreme law. This Part
examines three leading candidates and offers tentative answers to this important
question. 125
First, one may develop an argument on teleological grounds regarding the purposes
of our obligations or their likely consequences. 126 On this argument, we obey because
of prospective rewards, gains that will result from the original obligation. It is the end
in question, or telos, that forms the basis for the existing obligation. Utilitarianism may
123. See, e.g., RALPH S. KUYKENDALL & A. GROVE DAY, HAWAII: A HISTORY FROM
POLYNESIAN KINGDOM TO AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (1948); LILIUOKALANI, HAWAII'S STORY
BY HAWAU'S QUEEN (1964); GLENN W. PRICE, ORIGINS OF THE WAR WITH MEXICO: THE POLK-
STOCKTON INTRIGUE (1967); Oiis A. SINGLETARY, THE MEXICAN WAR (1960).
124. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,279-82 (1955) (asserting
that the Indian tribes have been conquered through warfare or forced treaties); id. at 289-90
(concluding that an Indian tribe's right to live on land must first be recognized by Congress);
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823) (holding that a discoverer may extinguish the
rights of Indian tribes to land by either conquest or purchase). See Nell Jessup Newton, At the
Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980).
125. As you read, treat the discussion as exploratory in nature. I examine this issue in much
greater detail elsewhere. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, On the Making of Happy Slaves
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
126. See generally R.M. Hare, Political Obligation, in SOCIAL ENDS AND POLITICAL MEANS I
(Ted Honderich ed., 1976).
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be catalogued under this rubric,127 as well as theories of political obligation grounded
on the common good of either a particular community or the larger whole.' 
28
The teleological argument is terribly unsatisfying in the context of territorial
acquisitions and the concept of self-determination. At first glance, teleological
arguments appear promising; after all, Puerto Rico has benefited considerably from its
relationship with the United States, particularly in terms of internal improvements and
social welfare programs. 129 But this position ultimately fails to justify the status of
Puerto Rico. In particular, this argument fails when measured in terms of political self-
determination. As Judge Cabranes intimates, Puerto Rico has paid a steep price for its
relationship to the United States: "political subordination and a deep, abiding sense of
dependency and powerlessness."' 30 This situation is not what one could sensibly
consider self-determination. '
3
The second argument looks instead to deontological theories, the types that ground
obligations on moral principles and duties outside the origin of the obligation. 132 In
other words, we obey because we must, on the strength of an existing moral code
outside of the obligation itself, for the same reasons that we must not lie or steal.
Deontology argues that consequences are irrelevant to the obligation itself and one's
duty to acquiesce. In the words of John Rawls, "we are to comply with and to do our
share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to assist
in the establishment ofjust arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can
be done with little cost to ourselves."' 
33
Deontological theories also fall short in response to the relationship between the
United States and Puerto Rico. According to these theories, we are only required to
obey just institutions and must only follow those rules and obey those institutions that
are just, good, and fair. The example of Puerto Rico does not meet this test. What we
need is an argument for justifying colonialism. Subjection to a sovereign's plenary
powers and its arbitrary will, 134 coupled with mass disenfranchisement, does not meet
this test.
The third argument tracks our commitment to obeying a sovereign's commands to a
prior voluntary agreement. This is consent theory, a leading account of political
127. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (R. Harrison ed., 1988)
(explaining the Utlilitarian view of government).
128. See T.H. GREEN, LECrURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLTCAL OBLIGATIONS AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Paul Harris & John Morrow eds., 1986).
129. See Jos6 A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico and the Constitution, 110 F.R.D. 475 (1986).
130. Id. at 479.
131. See Jos6 Trias Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View
of the Political Condition ofPuerto Rico, 68 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 1, 27 (1999) ("The subjection of a
people to the arbitrary will of another, the exercise of plenary power over dependent territory, is
not permissible."); id. at 28 ("Under the principles of liberty and equality no plenary powers can
be exercised by one people over another, even with their general consent.").
132. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 351 (1971).
133. Id.
134. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (stating that Congress could treat
Puerto Rico differently from states so long as there was a rational basis for its actions); Califano
v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978) (stating that unequal treatment of citizens in Puerto Rico is
acceptable so long as the reasoning behind the treatment is rational and not invidious).
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obligation. 135 This consent may come in a variety of forms, from an explicit ratification
of the terms of an agreement-as in the colonial ratification debates of 1787-88-to an
implicit acceptance reflected in one's decision to live under a particular political
regime. The case of Puerto Rico appears to fall within this well-accepted model on
both explicit and implicit grounds.
The first ground offers only modest resistance. The people of Puerto Rico first
enacted their existing constitution in 1952 under congressional authority vested by
Pub. L. 600.136 At this time, President Truman described the relationship between
Puerto Rico and the United States as "based on mutual consent and esteem."'1 37 In
addition, both the language of Law 600, which authorized the creation of a constitution
for the people of Puerto Rico, and the resulting Constitution of Puerto Rico refer to the
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico as a "compact."1 38 Finally,
courts and commentators alike, 139 including the U.S. Supreme Court,140 have used the
"compact" language.
135. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM, AND
POLITICAL THEORY 58, 60 (1989) ("Given the initial postulate of individual freedom and
equality, there is only one rational and acceptable justification for political obligation and
political authority. Individuals must themselves consent, contract, agree, choose or promise to
enter such a relationship."); Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753
(2000); Trfas Monge, supra note 131, at 27 ("[O]nly consent can supply an adequate basis for
the institution of government."). For criticisms, see, e.g., ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF
ANARCHISM (1971); Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Theory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1997).
136. Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, § 2, 64 Stat. 319.
137. TORRUELLA, supra note 51, at 158 (quoting Statement of President Truman, July 3,
1952).
138. Public Law 600 states: "[T]his Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact.... Act
of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (providing for the organization of a constitutional
government by the people of Puerto Rico). Article I of the Constitution of Puerto Rico states
that the polifical power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico "shall be exercised.., within the
terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of
America." P.R. CONST. art. I.
139. United States v. Quinonez, 758 F.2d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1985); RAYMOND CARR,
PUERTO Rico: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 77-78 (1984) (arguing that the relationship between the
United States and Puerto Rico is based on a compact as a result of the 1952 referendum and
adoption of the Puerto Rican Constitution); Rafael HernAndez Col6n, The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico: Territory or State?, 19 REV. COL. ABOG. P.R. 207 (1959); Hon. Calvert Magruder,
The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 5, 9-16 (1953).
140. Both Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 671 (1974), and
Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,594-96 (1976), for example, used language
of "compact." For a description of this compact, see Calero, 416 U.S. at 672 (quoting Mora v.
Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953)). See Arnold Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico: Trying to Gain Dignity and Maintain Culture, 17 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 1 (1982)
(contending that the Supreme Court has accepted the "compact" reading).
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But this argument ultimately fails. 141 Puerto Rico has been a colony since 1898, a
fact that remained unaltered after 1952 when island residents voted for and adopted
their own Constitution. 142 At best, their condition must be described as "colonialism
with the consent of the governed." 143 The fact that Congress retains plenary power
over the island and its affairs is determinative of this view. 144 True, Congress has never
acted to annul a law passed by Puerto Rican legislature. 4 5 One may also concede that
the relationship may be described as "dialectical," not as one-sided as the reference to
colonial status might imply. 146 All the same, this power of Congress exists, and it may
be exercised as needed. This situation is one of political subservience, not self-
determination.
The second ground is more difficult to dismiss. Since 1952, island residents have
renewed their commitment to their status as disenfranchised members of the American
political community in three subsequent plebiscites. These plebiscites mark three
independent moments in the history of Puerto Rico when voting pluralities on the
island consented to U.S. rule and the commonwealth experiment, 47 and they are
consistent with the great traditions of American democracy, such as the concept of
popular consent. According to John Fortier, for example, "Puerto Rico's referenda, in
141. See United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1172 (1st Cir. 1987) (Torruella J.,
concurring); Cabranes, supra note 129, at 481; David Helfeld, Congressional Intent and
Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the Constitution of the Commonwealth ofPuerto Rico, 31
REv. JUR. U.P.R. 255, 307 (1952) ('Though the formal title has been changed, in constitutional
theory Puerto Rico remains, a territory. This means that Congress continues to possess plenary
but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico.").
142. See TORRUELLA, supra note 51; Cabranes, supra note 129 (referring to status as
colonialism); see also JAMES E. KERR, THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN
AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM 119 (1982) ('The establishment of commonwealth status perpetrated
the myth that Puerto Ricans had exercised the right to self-determination. But that was not the
case. With the acceptance of the new status, Puerto Rico was not offered statehood, yet it was
no longer a colony in the sense that it had been."); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal
Relationships Between The United States and Its Affiliated US.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAw. L.
REv. 445 (1992) (agreeing with Judge Cabranes about Puerto Rico's colonial status). But see
David M. Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and Statutes Are Applicable to
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, 110 F.R.D. 452 (1985) ("In my opinion there is a compact,
in the nature of an understanding based on considerations of political morality, limited to the
Constitution of Puerto Rico and the provisions of Acts 600 and 447 which relate to the internal
affairs of the island.").
143. Cabranes, supra note 129, at n.26 ("[T]he phrase 'colonialism with the consent of the
governed' is a familiar one in Puerto Rico's politics."); see Trfas Monge, supra note 131, at 162.
144. TORRUELLA, supra note 51, at 194; Aleinikoff, supra note 121, at 33 (positing that the
argument that establishment of commonwealth ended Congress' plenary power "seems a
loser.").
145. See Helfeld, supra note 142, at 458.
146. MONTALvO-BARBOT, supra note 100, at 143. He explains: "[I]n general, the
presentation of the Puerto Rican people as passive agents in the constitutional transformation of
the island, an argument advanced by gradualists and traditional colonialist studies, is
analytically and empirically simplistic and questionable." Id.; see Leibowitz, supra note 140
(discussing the many issues involved in the status of Puerto Rico and its relationship to the
United States, especially statutory issues).
147. RomAn, supra note 68, at 39.
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which the island's citizens have voted against statehood and in favor of commonwealth
status, suggest that the values of democracy may be best served by honoring that
outcome and retaining commonwealth status."' 48 This argument is striking in its
simplicity: all we need to know is that the people of Puerto Rico consented to their
present status. This is American democracy at its best and in accordance with the
foundational values of the republic. Case closed.
But consent arguments can be pushed too far at times, and the example of Puerto
Rico is one of those times. How can one explain, much less justify, subjecting oneself
to political powerlessness? A cursory look at the earlier plebiscites in Puerto Rico does
not end the argument; it merely begins it, both descriptively and normatively. The
descriptive point is hard to dismiss: did the people of Puerto Rico in fact consent,
explicitly and decidedly, to the terms of their present condition? It is hard to look at the
process that led to the enactment of the Puerto Rican constitution in 1952 and conclude
otherwise. If they agreed to anything then, it was their condition as it exists today.
But the debate over to exactly what citizens of Puerto Rico have consented is far
less interesting than the normative question of whether the people of Puerto Rico
consented at all. This line of argument follows a long and influential tradition. Off
hand, the facts preclude support from the giants of the American liberal tradition. The
best argument looks to an unusual source-Hobbes's Leviathan. It goes something like
this:
Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some writers call
DESPOTICAL... as is the dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this
Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, and the Vanquished, to avoyd the present
stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes
of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the
Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made,
the vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant. . . is not
meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took
him, or bought him off one that did, shall consider what to do with him: but one,
that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run
away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.149
These are unpalatable words. On this view, one may conquer another and subject them
to their rule, yet remain within the requirements of consent theory. As Hobbes
explains, "It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the
Vanquished, but his own Covenant."' 50 Like the prototypical gunman hypothetical,
where one's compliance to the aggressor's demand is predictably given, Hobbes'
theoretical model labels a great deal of behavior that we would commonly label
coercive as consensual. His point is clear: whoever the sovereign may be, subjects
must obey their sovereign; his acts are their acts. Specifics about how the requisite
consent is secured are not important.
148. John C. Fortier, The Constitution Is Clear: Only States Vote in Congress, 116 YALE L.J.
PocKEr PART 403 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/20O7/05/19/fortier.htm.
149. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 255 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics 1985)
(1651).
150. Id. at 255-56.
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In this vein, the only consent one finds in the relationship between the territories
and the United States is one of the Hobbesian sort, where conquered peoples must
either consent or remain in a state of nature vis-A-vis their captors. Fittingly, historian
R.W. Van Alstyne has called the period between 1789 and 1823 the "Birth of the
American Leviathan."' 51 Thus, to say that the people of Puerto Rico consented to their
present political status may be descriptively accurate. Whether it is normatively
attractive-or as attractive as it might seem-is a more difficult and interesting
question. But this is a different debate altogether.
B. Balzac and the Follies of Citizenship
The question of citizenship as applied to residents of Puerto Rico raises a second
puzzle. This question looks back to the Foraker Act, under which Congress referred to
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico as "citizens of Puerto Rico." 152 From this time forward,
the status of the people of Puerto Rico remained an open and heavily debated
question.153 From 1901 to 1917, twenty-one bills were introduced in Congress to
confer American citizenship to citizens of Puerto Rico. 154 Presidents Roosevelt and
Taft endorsed many of these proposals, as well as the idea itself. President Wilson
went further when, in his first message to Congress, he proposed "giving [Puerto
Ricans] the ample and familiar rights and privileges accorded our own citizens in our
territories."' 155 Finally, on March 2, 1917, President Wilson signed into law the
Organic Act of 1917, also known as the Jones Act. 156
The Jones Act is best known for conferring U.S. citizenship upon citizens of Puerto
Rico. In light of all we know about the rhetoric of the times and the debates in the
United States over territorial expansion, this grant of citizenship raises a host of
important questions. For example, why did Congress choose to declare citizens of
Puerto Rico U.S. citizens? Further, did this seemingly drastic change in the status of
the Puerto Rican citizenry affect the status of the island under U.S. rule? And would
the U.S. citizenship extended to Puerto Ricans under the Jones Act be qualitatively
different from the concept of U.S. citizenship that existed elsewhere?
These questions, while undoubtedly of great importance for the island, do not
appear terribly difficult to answer. A plausible understanding of the Jones Act is that
Congress chose to extend U.S. citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico in order to
signal its willingness to incorporate the island into the fold as a full voting member of
the United States, essentially a precursor to statehood. 157 And why do this in 1917? No
151. R.W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE RISING AMERICAN EMPIRE 78-99 (1960).
152. 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended at 48 USC § 731 et seq (2000)).
153. For the leading account of this period in particular reference to the question of
citizenship, see Josd A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the
Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 391
(1978).
154. See TORRuELLA, supra note 51, at 85.
155. Id. at 89 (citing 51 CONG. REc. 74, 75 (1913)).
156. Ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
157. Cf Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1905) (discussing the pre-
statehood status of Alaska and the United State's plan to incorporate it into the union); Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 200 (1903) (discussing the pre-statehood status of Hawaii).
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better reason than the fact that the United States had failed to do so in the prior sixteen
years.
This reading of the legislative materials found much support in Puerto Rico.
However, it failed to garner much support with the U.S. Supreme Court. In fairness,
the congressional reasoning behind the enactment of the Jones Act is still shrouded in
much debate. An influential account posits that the United States finally extended its
citizenship to Puerto Rico for strategic military purposes. It argues that, with World
War I looming in the distance, the United States simply wished to enlist those Puerto
Ricans of age into the armed forces.' 58 This account appears decidedly wrong. 159 A
second account contends that Puerto Ricans yearned for American citizenship, and the
U.S. Congress was simply acquiescing to that desire.'60 A third account appears closer
to the mark: in extending citizenship to Puerto Rico, Congress was only strengthening
its relationship with Puerto Rico and signaling its commitment towards a long-term
future together. 161
Whatever the reasons, it soon became clear that the Jones Act did not accomplish as
much as one would think a grant of citizenship should. A scant five years after passage
of the Act, the U.S. Supreme Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico' 62 explained that in
conferring U.S. citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Congress in fact sought to
accomplish very little. According to Chief Justice Taft, the language of the statute was
vague and unclear on the question of incorporation, and Congress would not have
intended to take the "important step" of incorporating Puerto Rico into the United
States by "mere inference."' 63 How then to explain the Jones Act and its citizenship
provision? The Court answered, "When Porto Ricans passed from under the
government of Spain ... [t]hey had a right to expect, in passing under the dominion of
the United States, a status entitling them to the protection of their new sovereign."164
Congress was only extending the protection to which Puerto Rico had grown
accustomed while under Spanish rule. This is the least a colonial power should do.
Chief Justice Taft knew his Hobbes.
In taking this view, two further questions immediately surface. First, how should
one distinguish the Court's conclusion about Puerto Rico's non-incorporation from the
Court's prior conclusion on Alaska's incorporation? 65 This question is important for
how it informs the meaning and scope of the incorporation doctrine. It also underscores
the treatment of Puerto Rico at the hands of the Supreme Court. Second, what model of
citizenship is the Court implicitly adopting with respect to citizens of Puerto Rico?
That is, how should we understand the meaning of citizenship that undergirds the
Court's analysis?
158. See MANUEL MALDONADO-DENIS, PUERTO Rico: A SocIo-HIsToRIC INTERPRETATION
108 (Elena Vialo trans., Random House 1972) (1972).
159. See Cabranes, supra note 153, at 404-05.
160. See id. at 403-06.
161. See id. at 406-07.
162. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
163. Id. at 306.
164. Id. at 308.




The first question looks with care to the concept of incorporation introduced by
Justice White's opinion in Downes.166 What did Justice White mean by
"incorporation," and how did it apply to the acquisition of territories other than Puerto
Rico? Justice Brown criticized the doctrine precisely on these grounds in his
concurring opinion in Rassmussen v. United States:
What is an organized as distinguished from an incorporated Territory? Does not
the acceptance of a cession of territory and the appointment of a civil governor
work an incorporation of the territory as territory of the United States? If the
acceptance of territory as territory of the United States be not an incorporation,
what language is necessary to effect that result? 1
67
In other words, what made Puerto Rico an unincorporated territory, yet Alaska an
incorporated territory?
In Rassmussen, the Court offered three facts in support of its conclusion that Alaska
had been incorporated by Congress: the text of the treaty of acquisition; subsequent
congressional actions; and the Court's own decisions. 168 The text of the treaty was a
key to the Court's analysis; it read as follows: "The inhabitants of the ceded
territory... shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and
immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in
the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." 169 In contrast, the Treaty of
Paris following the Spanish-American War read quite differently: "The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress."' 170 If one of the consequences of
incorporation is to extend the full protections of the Constitution to the territory in
question, the Court's conclusion appears sensible. That is, by extending "all the rights,
advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States,"'17' the treaty of
acquisition with Russia treats the territorial residents of Alaska as incorporated. Yet,
by leaving the civil and political rights of territorial residents undecided, to be
determined by Congress at a future date, those territories are actually unincorporated
until Congress determines what these rights will be.
But if this conclusion is accurate, wouldn't the extension of citizenship to residents
of Puerto Rico-and all concomitant rights and privileges that any such extension of
citizenship must provide-affect the conclusion? In a word, no. In Balzac, the Court
concluded that the grant of U.S. citizenship to citizens of Puerto Rico did not signal the
intent of Congress on the question of incorporation. 72 The Court reached this
conclusion fully cognizant of the "incorporation" of Alaska, and distinguished it on
three grounds.
166. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
167. Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 533 (Brown, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 516-25.
169. Treaty Concerning the Cessation of the Russian Possessions in North America, U.S.-
Russ., Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 542.
170. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
171. Treaty of Cession, March 30, 1867, U.S.-Russ., 15 Stat. 542.
172. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 311 (1922).
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First, Alaska was "an enormous territory, very sparsely settled and offering
opportunity for immigration and settlement by American citizens."' 73 But this
argument is odd and misplaced. Unquestionably, Puerto Rico is relatively small-3435
square miles, compared to Alaska's 586,412 square miles-and, with close to 4 million
inhabitants, it clearly has more inhabitants than it needs. 174 Implicit in the Court's
argument is the idea that territorial expansion is nothing more than a means to provide
citizens with new and exciting places to migrate. What other reason could there be to
add territories as full-fledged members of the United States? The Court apparently
could not think of any.
In a second and related argument, the Court noted that Alaska was on the same
contiguous land mass, and "within easy reach of the then United States" 175 (it is a scant
1842 miles from Seattle to Juneau), whereas Americans wishing to go to Puerto Rico
would need to navigate the 1038 miles--or 902 nautical miles-between San Juan and
Miami. The same citizens who would wish to migrate to the enormous and sparsely
settled Alaskan land could do so easily and effortlessly, yet the same could not be said
of Puerto Rico. To the Court, traveling the distance between the United States and
Puerto Rico by water in 1905 posed grave obstacles.
Finally, incorporating Alaska "involved none of the difficulties which incorporation
of the Philippines and Porto Rico presents, and one of them is in the very matter of trial
by jury."'176 To the Court, the people of Puerto Rico were unfamiliar with the
institution of trial by jury in ways that the Alaska territory was not, and "Congress has
thought that a people like the Filipinos or the Porto Ricans, trained to a complete
judicial system which knows no juries, living in compact and ancient communities...
should be permitted themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt this institution
of Anglo-Saxon origin, and when."'
177
This argument is non-responsive--or just plain wrong-in two ways. The first
problem is the Court's use of history; for, while it was true that the institution of trial
by jury was not used under the Spanish regime, it was also true that jury trials had been
established in district court since 1899 and "[b]y 1922 ... were a common thing in
Puerto Rico."178 The second problem is that of doctrinal consistency. The question for
the Court was whether Congress had incorporated Puerto Rico through the grant of
citizenship, not whether Congress had wished for Puerto Ricans to decide whether to
adopt trial by jury. If the leading evidence the Court needed in Rassmussen was "the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United
States"' 179 for its conclusion that Alaska had been incorporated by Congress, then it
must be the case that the actual grant of citizenship would accord these inhabitants the
same "rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States."180 It must
also mean that the grant of citizenship signaled Congress' intent to incorporate the
173. Id. at 309.
174. See Welcome to Puerto Rico, http://welcome.topuertorico.org/index.shtml.
175. Id. at 309.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 310.
178. TORRUELLA, supra note 51, at 100.




island. If this argument is inaccurate, we must then examine the model of citizenship
implicitly adopted by the Court in Balzac.
Turning to the second question flagged earlier, about the meaning of citizenship
adopted by the Court with respect to Puerto Rico and the Jones Act of 1917. This
question is another way of asking, "[w]hat does it mean to be an American?"181 Three
answers come to mind.
One answer understands citizenship as identity. For a description, listen to Nicias
during the Sicilian campaign of 413, as he reminds his troops that "if you now escape
from the enemy, you may all see again what your hearts desire, while those of you who
are Athenians will raise up again the great power of the state, fallen though it be."'
182
He continued, "Men make the city, and not walls or ships without men in them."1 83 On
this view, the citizen and the city are one and the same. More importantly, citizens
understand themselves as part of the city. That is, Athenian citizens are not simply the
recipients of rights and privileges by virtue of their standing as citizens. Instead, the
citizens are Athens. They feel it. They know it. Or, in the words of Rogers Brubaker,
"citizenship is not a mere reflex of residence; it is an enduring personal status that is
not generated by passing or extended residence alone and does not lapse with
temporary or prolonged absence."' 84
A second answer equates citizenship to membership.185 This is the leading model of
citizenship. 186 T.H. Marshall's classic argument takes root in this understanding.
According to Marshall, citizenship is "a status bestowed on those who are full
members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the
rights and duties with which the status is endowed."'187 On this view, rights and
privileges flow from one's status as citizen of a political community.
181. Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597,598 (1999) (reviewing
ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997));
see Ronald Takaki, Race at the End of History, in THE GOOD CITIZEN 81,82 (David Batstone &
Eduardo Mendieta eds., 1999).
182. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 474 (Richard Crawley trans., Modem Library
1982).
183. Id.
184. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1992).
185. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 12 (1990). For critiques of this model, see id. at 20-27; Paul Tiao, Non-
Citizen Suffrage: An Argument Based on the Voting Rights Act and Related Law, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 171, 215-217 (1993).
186. In the leading casebook in the immigration law field, for example, the authors define
citizenship as "a term generally understood to mean full members of the state, entitled to the
basic rights and opportunities afforded by the state." T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A.
MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1 (4th
ed., 1998). Similarly, Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith define citizenship rules under one of two
principles, either ascription or consensual. On either account, as they understand them, the
relevant question is one of political community. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH,
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 4 (1985).
187. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CLASS, CIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS 65, 84 (1964).
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Closely related to the first two answers is a third model of citizenship, defended by
Judith Shklar in her Tanner Lectures, which she labeled "citizenship-as-standing." 1
88
This model is "a genuinely historical and politically informed understanding of what
citizenship has been and now is in America."' 8 9 Shklar focuses on two social and
political practices that symbolize one's status in the community: earning and voting. Of
note, both of these practices must be understood against the background of chattel
slavery; that is, it is central to her model that slaves could neither vote nor work, and
that many groups have often equated their social and political condition with the
institution of slavery. As she writes, "[firom the first [Americans] defined their
standing as citizens very negatively, by distinguishing themselves from their inferiors,
especially from slaves and occasionally from women." 190
Put thusly, the struggle for the franchise and for the status of free agent in the
marketplace have been struggles for inclusion and recognition of one's status as a
republican citizen. Her point here is significant. To Shklar, the value of the franchise
hinges on the prior question of standing. That is to say, Blacks and women fought for
the franchise as part of their fight for inclusion and recognition within the political
community. Young people did not undergo a similar process, and as such, the 26th
Amendment has a much different significance for them, if any at all. "[T]he vote," she
writes, "gains its value from the standing that it confers." 191
All three models fail in reference to citizens of Puerto Rico. The identity model
demands a close connection between citizen and country, an identification between
nation and self. But citizens of Puerto Rico are Puerto Rican first, estadounidenses in
name only. 192 To be sure, the United States attempted to "Americanize" Puerto Rico in
myriad ways, such as the imposition of English as the official language and the open
encouragement of American forms of patriotism. 193 These efforts ultimately failed, as
"Puerto Rican identity and culture proved resilient enough to survive
'Americanization.' 194
The membership model fails as well. Citizens of Puerto Rico are not members of
the larger U.S. polity, with membership defined as a status of equality in rights and
duties. If members at all, they are so in name only, as dual citizens of Puerto Rico and
the United States. But their membership is one unquestionably grounded in inequality.
The standing model is important for what it tells us about the condition of Puerto
Rican citizens. If voting symbolizes one's status in the larger community, the
disenfranchisement of the people of Puerto Rico sends a very clear signal about their
standing in the U.S. polity. Women and slaves fought for the right to vote, and
188. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 2 (1991); see
also Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Sufirage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391, 1448 (1993) (arguing that
without the franchise, one "lack[s] the crucial form of social recognition").
189. SHKLAR, supra note 188, at 9.
190. Id. at 15.
191. Id. at 18-19.
192. See Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J.
RACE. & L. 1 (2000).
193. See id. at 67-69.
194. Id. at 70.
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ultimately achieved it, thus securing their inclusion within the political community.
The people of Puerto Rico cannot vote. Their fight for inclusion is still to come.
And so, after Balzac, the purpose of extending American citizenship to the
territories remains an open question. This is second-class citizenship at best, 195 and
"yet another transmutation of the meaning of citizenship in the American political
system."' 196 More tellingly, the grant of American citizenship has meant only that
territorial residents have the right to travel to the United States and back to their
territories of origin. 197 As Judge Torruella complained, "In this 211th year of the
United States Constitution, and 102nd year of United States presence in Puerto Rico,
United States citizenship must mean more than merely the freedom to travel to and
from the United States." 198 Surely citizenship must mean much more than that.
C. Voting and the Territories: On the Virtues of Statehood
The Insular Cases and Balzac converge on what is perhaps the most appalling
aspect of the status of Puerto Rico: its lack of representation in Congress and the
Electoral College. This disenfranchisement places citizens of Puerto Rico in an
unenviable and indefensible position, as they have no power to affect the very
institution that holds full and complete discretionary powers over them. Neither
democratic theory nor the modem voting rights revolution provides any support for
this lack of representation. But as anyone familiar with the history of women's suffrage
can attest, 99 this position receives support in the only place that counts: the federal
courts and the constitutional text.
In Sanchez v. United States ,20 the district court concluded that a constitutional
challenge to the disenfranchisement of citizens of Puerto Rico under the Electoral
College was "insubstantial" 20' and "plainly without merit. ' '2(2 Looking to the text of
the Constitution and sprinkling in a bit of its history, the court explained that the
Constitution does not confer the right to vote on anyone, but leaves the issue entirely to
the discretion of the states.20 3 Puerto Rico is not a state, and thus Puerto Ricans are
fully disenfranchised for federal office. In closing, the court underscored that it "is of
the opinion that it is inexcusable that there still exists a substantial number of U.S.
citizens who cannot legally vote for the President and Vice president of the United
States." 2° 4 Yet absent a constitutional amendment or statehood for the island,
according to the court, the facts did not raise a substantial constitutional question.
This conclusion is difficult to defend. How can one justify the disenfranchisement
of millions of U.S. citizens on U.S. soil? To be sure, none of the models of citizenship
195. RoGERs M. SMITH, Civic IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CrTIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
430 (1999); Rivera Ramos, supra note 72, at 108; Romdn, supra note 68.
196. Rivera Ramos, supra note 72, at 107.
197. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 308 (1922).
198. Igarnia de la Rosa v. United States (Igartia I1), 229 F.3d 80, 89 (1st Cir. 2000).
199. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165-66 (1874).
200. 376 F.Supp. 239 (D.P.R. 1974).
201. Id. at 240.
202. Id. at 241.
203. Id.
204. id. at 242.
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discussed previously offer much support. Neither the standing model nor the
membership model justifies the decoupling of voting from citizenship--in fact, these
models posit the right to vote as the dividing line between citizens and non-citizens-
while the identity model does not speak to the grant of the franchise at all. But to say
that theoretical justifications are lacking is only half the story. After all, citizens of
Puerto Rico are not alone in their disenfranchisement; felons are also among this
group, as are children. And in both of those cases, the constitutional text and/or its
history did most of the heavy lifting as well. 20 5
And so the citizens of Puerto Rico are grouped alongside felons and children in the
voting rights hierarchy. The states can do as they wish, and non-states cannot do
anything at all. 206 This situation is mildly surprising, for as Pam Karlan writes, "there
is widespread doctrinal and popular commitment to the general principle of universal
adult citizen suffrage." 20 7 Refusing to extend this commitment to citizens of Puerto
Rico did not require fancy rhetoric or an agile legal mind. On the contrary, it only
required the ability to read a text and apply its plain meaning thoughtlessly. It is not
surprising that the argument has survived the test of time. 208 So long as Puerto Rico
remains a territory, its citizens-U.S. citizens at birth-will remain disenfranchised for
federal elections. This disenfranchisement is one of the black holes of U.S.-style
democracy.
IV. BACK TO THE REVOLUTION: PAYING TAXES
Commonwealth has been the clear preference because it's been a good deal.
Puerto Ricans are American citizens - but with a few exceptions. They get no
vote for president and have no voting representation in Congress, yet pay no
federal income taxes. Given that deal, many of us stateside might seek
commonwealth status. 209
To this point, defenders of the status quo are likely to shrug their shoulders,
unimpressed and unpersuaded. They offer two rejoinders. The first argument,
discussed previously, contends that Puerto Ricans have consented to their present
condition, first in 1952 with the forming of their existing constitution, and later through
the various plebiscites that demonstrate complacency with the status quo. This Part
briefly discusses the second argument, which is a variant of the popular revolutionary
205. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
206. See Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a
Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174 (2007).
207. Pamela S. Karlan, The Impact ofthe Voting Rights Act on African Americans: Second-
and Third-Generation Issues, in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 121,
122 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
208. See Igartda de la Rosa (Igartia IV), 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); Igartda de
la Rosa v. United States (Igarttia III), 386 F.3d 313 (lst Cir. 2005), vac and reh "g, 404 F.3d 1
(I st Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 407 F.3d 30 (1 st Cir. 2005) (en banc); Igartda de la Rosa v. United States
(Igarttia I1), 107 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000), rev'd, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000); Igartda de la
Rosa v. United States (Igarttia 1), 842 F.Supp. 607 (D.P.R. 1994), affid, 32 F.3d 8 (lst Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1049 (1995).
209. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Kenneth L. Adelman, Op-Ed., Stirring Up Trouble In Puerto
Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at WK13.
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slogan "no taxation without representation." This answer attempts to legitimize the
disenfranchisement of citizens of Puerto Rico on the basis that they do not pay federal
taxes.
This argument is probably too simple, akin to a "sound bite:, 2 10 citizens of Puerto
Rico do not vote, but they also do not pay federal taxes. On its face, this feels like a
losing argument, particularly because it does not respond to the original claim. If
Congress were to decide today that citizens of Puerto Rico must pay federal taxes, such
a decision would not transform the island into an incorporated territory. This lack of
taxation is only an exemption from the U.S. Tax code,211 an exemption that Congress
can readily take away. Indeed, the argument is a non sequitur. Furthermore, residents
of Puerto Rico are not exempt from all taxes; they pay the same social security taxes
and receive the same benefits as residents of the fifty states.212 Finally, if the argument
over the disenfranchisement of Puerto Rico comes down to dollars and cents, it might
be useful to remember that Puerto Rico receives reduced federal benefits. The
government of Puerto Rico offsets this reduction with higher local taxes.21 3
As a question of policy, this argument thus has a straightforward escape hatch: If
Congress would only eliminate the tax exemption while increasing the benefits its
sends to the island, the local government could lower its own taxes. In the end, citizens
of Puerto Rico would pay the same amount in taxes while, if those who defend the
status quo are correct, gaining the right to vote in federal elections.
As a question of constitutional law, however, the argument is even simpler. Judge
Pieras explained in his opinion in Igarttia II:
Although the United States gives the residents of Puerto Rico billions of dollars in
aid each year, it is implausible to argue that receiving such aid results in the
waiving of the constitutional right to freedoms materialized by the right to vote.
Nor does it hold water to state that such trade-off is economically worthwhile.
Freedom is priceless and cannot be bought at the expense of a slap in the face with
a $5.00 bill.214
The right to vote cannot be contingent on the payment of a tax. In fact, the mere
suggestion that U.S. citizens may be disenfranchised due to their exemption from
federal taxes runs against the spirit, if not the letter, of the prohibition against poll
taxes.215 The argument is never phrased in this way, yet the suggestion is clear-the
payment of taxes must precede the grant of the right to vote. This requirement would
be plainly unconstitutional.2 16
210. See Christina Duffy Burnett, Two Puerto Rican Senators Stay Home, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 408 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/05/19/bumett.htmi.
211. See David C. Indiano, The Top 1O Myths About Puerto Rico Statehood, 52 FED. LAw. 8,
10 (2005) ("Puerto Ricans pay all the federal taxes that Congress requires them to pay.").
212. Igartia III, 386 F.3d at 315 (Torruella, dissenting) ("It should be noted that Puerto Rico
residents pay the same Social Security tax as the citizens who reside in the states and receive the
same benefits." (emphasis in original)).
213. Burnett, supra note 210.
214. Igarttia de la Rosa v. United States (Ignartia I1), 107 F.Supp. 140, 147 (D.P.R. 2000).
215. See Amber L. Cottle, Comment, Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and
the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U. Cin. LEGAL F. 315, 327-30 (1995).
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966)
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To be clear, I do not take a view on the question of whether citizens of Puerto Rico
must be granted the right to vote in federal elections while retaining their tax
exemptions. Some commentators decry the idea because "[t]his makes voting rights yet
another federal handout-another big fat favor handed down from on high by Congress
to its lowly colonial subjects. 217 This is an argument that couples the right to vote
with the responsibility of paying taxes. It is fine as far as arguments go. But make no
mistake: this is a policy argument, not democratic theory or constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
The status of Puerto Rico under U.S. law raises innumerable questions of
democratic theory and constitutional law. The answers are neither encouraging nor
surprising. Citizens of Puerto Rico are American citizens at birth who cannot vote for
either Electoral College delegates or congressional representation. This circumstance is
an embarrassment for American democracy. It is unseemly to hold onto territories in
perpetuity, grant their inhabitants American citizenship, yet subject them to the full
discretionary powers of congressional majorities. It is also inconsistent with American
constitutional values. According to Judge Pieras, "The United States Constitution
forever changed the history of humanity when it did away with human bondage. It did
away with slavery and, in doing so, vindicated the principle that all men are created
equal. The inability to vote represents a form of slavery as it subordinates the will of
the people. 2 Is
Yet Puerto Ricans appear unconcerned by this, as polling data and plebiscite results
amply reflect. 219 But acquiescence in the face of a tragic choice does not place the
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico on the road to democratic
legitimacy. At best, the condition of the island of Puerto Rico under American rule is
"colonialism by consent., 220 How else can one explain support for a condition that
subjects your country to discretionary rule by another with no existing recourse to
exact political change?
The solution to this present condition is simple. Puerto Rico must either gain its
independence or be granted the right to vote in federal elections. Congress must also
cease to hold plenary powers over the island. Colonialism is a state of affairs
inconsistent with our constitutional order. 221
("To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to
introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.").
217. Burnett, supra note 210.
218. Ignartiia II, 107 F.Supp. at 148.
219. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Bringing Democracy to Puerto Rico: A Rejoinder, 11 HARV.
LATINoL. REV. 157, 164-65 (2008).
220. Aleinikoff, supra note 121, at 33.
221. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, J.,
concurring) (condemning the present political status of Puerto Rico as "colonial treatment by
the United States"); Lisa Napoli, The Legal Recognition of the National Identity ofa Colonized
People: The Case of Puerto Rico, 18 B.C. THiRD WoRLD L.J. 159, 160 (1998); Romdn, supra
note 68, at 6 (illustrating "the incompatibility of equality under colonialism").
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